Emergency preparedness for tunnel fires – A systems-oriented approach by Bjelland, Henrik et al.
Safety Science 143 (2021) 105408
Available online 28 July 2021
0925-7535/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Emergency preparedness for tunnel fires – A systems-oriented approach 
Henrik Bjelland a,*, Ove Njå b, Atle William Heskestad c, Geir Sverre Braut d 
a Multiconsult Norge AS, Oslo & University of Stavanger, 4036 Stavanger, Norway 
b University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway 
c Norwegian Railway Directorate, Oslo, Norway 
d Stavanger University Hospital, Stavanger, Norway   
A R T I C L E  I N F O   
Keywords: 
Tunnel fire safety 
Systems approach 
Emergency preparedness analysis 
Constraints 
A B S T R A C T   
Efficient emergency response is key to preventing major losses in tunnel fires. Our general concern in this paper 
is the degree to which tunnel systems are prepared and the means by which we can be prepared for a major fire in 
a single-tube road tunnel. Conformance to prescriptive regulations dominates existing practice in the area of 
emergency preparedness. Risk-based approaches exist but have little influence on emergency preparedness de-
signs for tunnel systems. A successful emergency response to tunnel fires is dependent on many actors collab-
orating under serious time constraints. Safety becomes a matter of controlling critical processes necessary to keep 
the system in a safe state. Efficient decision-making in situations of major uncertainty is vital, to achieve safety 
goals. This essentially means that efficient emergency preparedness for road tunnels is a matter that needs 
attention in the early design phases and continuous improvements during the operational phase. To achieve high- 
performance emergency preparedness against tunnel fires, there is a need for radical changes to the design and 
operation of tunnels. In this paper, it is claimed that a system-theoretic approach is appropriate to deal with the 
tunnel system’s complexity and to drive the design of appropriate control structures for critical processes, from 
the design phase to the actual emergency. It is shown how system theoretic approaches will change the safety 
management practices for tunnels and how this will increase consistency between potential fire scenarios and 
associated control actions.   
1. Introduction 
1.1. Tunnel developments 
Let us start with a scenario: Consider you are driving into a dark hole 
in the mountain: the sudden change from day to night and the fumbling 
to get the headlights on. Water is dripping on your windshield, and the 
rough-surfaced walls are passing by at 80 km/h. At regular intervals, you 
pass emergency stations. Small signs indicate that there is a telephone 
and a fire extinguisher there. In an emergency, using this phone will put 
you in direct contact with the traffic control center (TCC) and immedi-
ately confirm your position in the tunnel. This is useful for the TCC and 
the emergency responders. You, on the other hand, try to master the 
balancing act of avoiding traffic coming in the opposite direction and 
hitting the tunnel wall. Maybe you notice the signs and spend time 
reflecting on their meaning, or maybe not. 
Not many years ago, many transport tunnels were merely holes 
through the mountain: simple constructions to enable roads and 
railways to pass through otherwise impassable terrains. While this 
description is still true for many Norwegian tunnels, regulatory and 
technological developments over the past two decades have led to major 
changes. Generally, modern tunnels are less hostile environments than 
their predecessors were. For example, the portals of road tunnels are 
equipped with railings and a more crash-friendly design. Better lighting 
technology reduces the rapid transition of light from the outside to the 
inside. Tunnel owners invest more in designing better banquettes and 
guiding edges, to reduce the hazard of running off the road. Traffic 
management equipment, such as camera surveillance (ITV) and auto-
matic incident detection (AID), have become mandatory in more tun-
nels. The same goes for emergency response systems such as emergency 
lighting, variable signs for notifications, constantly illuminated and 
better protected emergency stations, and even loudspeakers for 
communicating with drivers. 
Looking ahead, the tunnel safety industry is considering even more 
safety measures. How can tunnel owners make use of new communi-
cation technology, the Internet of things, artificial intelligence or 
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machine learning? Would it be possible in the future to keep track of 
every vehicle and person in every tunnel, providing them with precise 
instructions during an emergency? The opportunities are many: cheap 
Bluetooth beacons, detection of humans by exploiting existing fiber 
cables, vehicle-to-vehicle communication or drones performing contin-
uous inspections in the tunnels. Maybe it will also become possible to 
build safe evacuation rooms in long single-tube tunnels, where traffic 
load is limited and no other means of egress exist. 
1.2. Tunnels, fire risk and emergency response 
Societal pressure to increase safety and emergency preparedness in 
tunnels is strong. The tragic fires in central Europe around the turn of the 
millennium, which so clearly illustrate the major consequence potential 
of serious events in general, and fires in particular, is a reminder of why. 
There are over 20 fires in Norway’s 1150 road tunnels each year 
(Nævestad & Meyer, 2014), some of them quite serious e.g. Oslofjord 
2011 (NSIA, 2013) and 2017 (NSIA, 2018), Gudvanga 2013 (NSIA, 
2015) and 2015 (NSIA, 2016a), Skatestraum 2015 (NSIA, 2016b) and 
Fjærland 2017 (NSIA, 2019). Investigations by the Norwegian Safety 
Investigation Authority (NSIA) have raised concerns regarding the risk 
management approaches (NSIA, 2013), and the emergency prepared-
ness systems have also been criticized (NSIA, 2015; 2016a). 
The European Commission’s Directive on minimum safety re-
quirements for tunnels in the Trans-European Road Network (EU, 2004) 
was a result of the European fires around year 2000. Many Norwegian 
tunnels (173 tunnels) fall under the scope of the Directive. The Euro-
pean Free Trade Association’s (EFTA) Surveillance Authority (ESA) 
recently concluded that “Norway has failed to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 3(1) and 11 of the Directive” (ESA, 2020), with 64 tunnels not in 
compliance with the Directive over one year after the April 30, 2019 
deadline. A hint of this conclusion came in 2016, when the Office of the 
Auditor General of Norway (OAGN) issued a report on safety manage-
ment in road tunnels. The report points at several challenges, such as: 
failure to include tunnel-specific issues in risk assessments; lack of fire 
drills in several tunnels; lack of documentation of safety management 
procedures; lack of information to drivers about safe behavior in tun-
nels; and weak management and monitoring by the central authorities 
(OAGN, 2016). 
Transport tunnels are slowly developing into high technology sys-
tems. Many would argue that the level of safety is increasing, and maybe 
it is. Nevertheless, introducing new technology, coupling more systems 
and exploiting new opportunities in existing systems lead to a new level 
of complexity. Expanding the perspective, we must also consider trends 
of traffic growth, climate change and increased dependence on national 
critical infrastructures. Transportation infrastructures are generally 
vulnerable, due to lack of redundancy, long repair time, rerouting dif-
ficulties or cascading failures and interdependencies (Pitilakis et al., 
2016). Their damage could be greatly disruptive in terms of safety of life, 
business disruption, access to emergency services and key lifeline utili-
ties, rescue operations and socioeconomic impacts. The potential to 
achieve major safety improvements exists. In the process of exploiting 
opportunities, it is essential to avoid creating new, hidden vulnerabil-
ities that reveal themselves when exposed to accidental loads. This is 
where good emergency preparedness planning comes in. 
1.3. Good emergency preparedness and safety 
Emergency preparedness involves all technical, operational and 
organizational measures that prevent a dangerous situation that has 
occurred from developing into an accidental event, or which prevent or 
reduce the harmful effects of accidental events that have occurred (Njå, 
1998; Njå et al., 2020). 
A literature search, using the search engine, Scopus, on the keywords 
“tunnel risk”, “tunnel emergency”, “tunnel preparedness” and “tunnel 
system safety” led to a selection of 48 initially interesting articles. 
Browsing through the articles’ abstracts led to the definition of nine 
classes of topics. Table 1 shows the distribution of articles over the nine 
topics. It is interesting to notice that the number of articles in classes 1, 
4, 6 and 7 totals 25. A possible interpretation is that tunnel risk, emer-
gency and preparedness are currently closely associated with regulative 
requirements and specific safety measures, fire and smoke transport, 
previous events (statistics) and evacuation issues. The number of articles 
in class 1 could also be the result of the traditional safety management 
strategy in the European transport sector, i.e., conformance to pre-
scriptive regulations (Marsden & Bonsall, 2006; Ingason & Wickström, 
2006; Bjelland & Aven, 2013; Kazaras & Kirytopoulos, 2014). 
In this paper, we are interested in approaching tunnel emergency 
preparedness from a holistic and alternative perspective. All articles 
classified as topic 2 are part of understanding the state of the art. We also 
prioritized analyzing a selection of articles classified as topics 1, 3 and 9. 
Several authors emphasize performance-based targets and leading 
performance indicators as important for safety development in the 
transport and tunneling industry (see e.g. Marsden & Bonsall, 2006; 
Ingason & Wickström, 2006; Gehandler et al., 2014; Kazaras et al., 2014; 
Pitilakis et al., 2016). According to Marsden & Bonsall (2006), defining 
performance targets enables better public management, legal and 
contractual obligations, resource constraints, consumer orientation and 
political aspirations. Gehandler et al. (2014) outline a framework built 
on five main functional requirements for fire safety in tunnels: 1) orga-
nization and management, 2) limiting the generation and spread of fire 
and smoke, 3) providing the means for safe self-evacuation, 4) providing 
the means and safety for the rescue service to intervene, and 5) ensuring 
the load-bearing capacity of the construction. 
Kirytopoulos and coworkers (Kazaras et al., 2012; Kazaras & Kir-
ytopoulos, 2014; Ntzeremes & Kirytopoulos, 2018; Ntzeremes & Kir-
ytopoulos, 2019) have made a noticeable contribution to tunnel safety 
research, from a risk assessment and systems thinking perspective. The 
authors are critical of quantitative risk assessments (QRA), based on 
their limited ability to take into account human factors in emergency 
situations, organizational aspects, software behavior, system complexity 
and the dynamic nature of risk. The lack of appropriate data and the 
treatment of uncertainties are also issues. The authors propose systems 
theory as a basis for an alternative approach, based on Leveson’s STAMP 
model (Kazaras et al., 2012). The STAMP model should complement 
QRA approaches, not be a substitute for them. 
Alvear et al. (2013) present a decision support system for emergency 
management in tunnels. Their idea is to provide operators with decision 
recommendations using predictive tools to deal with emergencies in real 
time. They argue that tunnel safety is dependent on three major factors: 
1) tunnel design, 2) tunnel management, and 3) emergency response. Cur-
rent approaches focus on tunnel design and facilities, risk analysis and 
contingency plans, implying a lack of focus on 2) and 3). The tunnel 
operator plays a critical role in initiating the emergency response, 
Table 1 




1 Regulations, design, technical requirements and specific 
safety measures 
12 
2 Alternative approaches to safety and emergency management 
in tunnels 
8 
3 “Traditional” risk and hazard assessment models (normative 
or case studies) 
6 
4 Smoke transport (CFD, experiments, etc.) 5 
5 Emergency management: frameworks, models and simulators 4 
6 Accident investigation and fire statistics 4 
7 Evacuation from tunnels 4 
8 Review papers on traffic safety design and fire safety design of 
tunnels 
3 
9 Other 2  
SUM = 48  
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informing tunnel users and emergency services. Fixed protocols are 
often the basis for the operator’s decision-making, while the emergency 
is inherently dynamic and calls for a flexible decision-making process. 
Fridolf et al. (2013) argue that evacuation theory from building 
research is generally applicable to tunnels, although some differences 
exist. The behavior sequence model, the role-rule model, the affiliative 
model and social influence are explanation models for evacuation 
behavior. A major difference between buildings and tunnel systems is 
often the longer distances to emergency exits or safety shelters. This calls 
for measures to increase walking speed. It also inhibits emergency 
personnel and makes rescue operations more complex. Trains and cars 
may also function as obstructions that affect the flow of people towards 
the emergency exit. Information given during an emergency must be 
clear and coherent. Tunnel design does not pay adequate attention to 
people with disabilities. Tunnel users with disabilities, e.g., wheelchair 
users, must rely on assistance from other tunnel users. 
1.4. Motivation and problem formulation 
Investigations after major accidents and system audits have revealed 
severe shortcomings in the safety management of tunnels (NSIA 2013; 
NSIA, 2018; Njå et al. 2013; OAGN 2016). Real-time understanding of 
risk in the tunnel systems is lacking. With hindsight, we were able to 
acknowledge that the level of risk in the Oslofjord tunnel was unac-
ceptable before the major fire in 2011. With hindsight, we can question 
the smoke management strategy adopted in both the Oslofjord and the 
Gudvanga fires in 2011 and 2013 (NSIA, 2013; 2015), respectively. With 
hindsight, we acknowledge that the emergency response systems could 
have a better design, coordination and training. New tunnel systems 
need new approaches for emergency preparedness planning. 
Emergency preparedness needs attention in the early design phases 
and continual improvements during operation. If our existing ap-
proaches to safety management are not up to this task, which seems to be 
the case, we need to conscientiously search for improvements. An 
approach based on systems theory is promising. First, systems theory 
aims at achieving a holistic understanding of systems, which means that 
understanding the increasing complexity of tunnel systems is a major 
goal of the process. Existing approaches come with few incentives to 
explore and understand complexity, and over-simplifications and a 
rejection of uncertainties often result. Second, systems theory ac-
knowledges the dynamic nature of complex and open socio-technical 
systems. Existing approaches are more adapted to compliance and 
verification than to understanding and providing a foundation for 
managing safety, from a lifetime perspective. 
In this paper, the framework from Bjelland et al. (2015) is adopted 
for designing emergency preparedness and response measures in an 
assessment of control structures responding to fire risks in a single-tube 
road tunnel. Our study takes a Norwegian perspective concerning road 
tunnel standards, safety regulations, dimensioning of emergency 
response and its organization, climate and other frame conditions. Our 
major concern in this paper is to contribute to a framework for under-
standing and developing safety constraints for road tunnels. Safety 
constraints are a central concept to systems theory, and it is critical that 
a sound understanding underlies design processes and tunnel operation. 
2. Existing practice for design and operation of tunnels 
2.1. Existing safety regulations 
There are several ways to design safety regulations, all with their 
own benefits and challenges. Table 2 is a presentation of a possible 
classification scheme consisting of two axes. On the one axis, the 
framework distinguishes between regulating means or ends (outcomes). 
On the other axis, the framework distinguishes between regulating the 
components of a system (micro level) or the system as a whole (macro 
level) (TRB, 2017; Lindøe m.fl, 2018). Regulating the means implies 
presenting more or less detailed expectations on design, procedures or 
actions to be taken. This is in contrast with regulating the ends, where 
the performance and ultimate outcomes of the system are to be evalu-
ated. The traditional inspection function (either internal or external) is 
set up to control immediate adherence to norms, rather than evaluating 
the performance of a given system. When controlling performance, it is 
often necessary to penetrate the given system in more detail when trying 
to judge whether the system established is designed to deliver outcomes 
as regulations require. Effective controlling of the ends is often regarded 
as dependent on a high level of trust among the actors in the system 
(Hellebust & Braut, 2012). 
The Road Tunnel Safety Regulations (SD, 2007) (includes the EU 
Directive) and the “N500 Road Tunnels regulation” (NPRA, 2020) 
generally fall under the category micro-means. Compliance with detailed 
safety measures generally implies an acceptable safety level. However, 
the regulations also include requirements to conduct risk analyses, 
macro-means, for most tunnels (NPRA, 2020). Article 11(1) of the Road 
Tunnel Safety Regulations allows for derogations for innovative tech-
niques. Provided the alternative safety measures will result in equivalent 
or improved protection, the administrative authority may grant such 
derogations (EU, 2004). 
In practice, it is cumbersome to derogate the regulations in design 
processes. This involves preparing an application based on a risk anal-
ysis, both when adding and removing safety measures. The Norwegian 
Public Road Administration (NPRA) is also restrictive in its policy to 
approve added safety measures, as this could lead to precedence in 
similar cases and higher overall costs of tunnel construction. Hence, the 
regulations and the administrative management of the process provide 
few incentives for risk-based safety engineering. Risk analysis becomes a 
tool to verify compliance with the regulations, rather than a tool to 
explore the risks of the specific tunnels and an important foundation for 
design and emergency preparedness decisions. 
In November 2016, the NPRA issued a new version of Handbook 
N500 Road Tunnels (NPRA, 2016). This version introduces the concept of 
emergency preparedness as a part of the safety management of Nor-
wegian road tunnels. An emergency preparedness analysis is now 
required for tunnels greater than 1,000 meters. The emergency pre-
paredness analysis must cover the phases from alert, mobilization, 
rescue, and evacuation to normalization. There is, however, no mention 
of the important phases of detection and combat, which are natural parts 
of an emergency preparedness analysis (Njå, 1998). 
Although road tunnels are required to be designed based on risk 
assessments and emergency preparedness analyses, a major problem is 
that no one has described acceptable risk levels or specific requirements 
for emergency preparedness. As a quality assurance measure, N500 re-
quires the Norwegian Public Roads Directorate to approve the method 
chosen for risk and emergency preparedness analyses. This practice may 
prevent sub-quality analyses. However, as the selection of methods for 
risk and preparedness analyses depends upon the scope of the analyses 
and available data, the practice imposes major competency re-
quirements on those who shall approve the methodological design. 
2.2. Vertical (silo) thinking 
Vertical thinking, which dominates current design and emergency 
preparedness practices, is about building layers on layers of knowledge 
within a certain field, without looking at what goes on outside your “silo 
of knowledge”. This way of thinking may impose serious restrictions on 
the understanding of relevant knowledge for a specific field of 
Table 2 
Classification scheme for regulation designs (TRB, 2017).   
Means Ends 
Micro Micro-means“Prescriptive” Micro-ends“Performance-based” 
Macro Macro-means“Management based” Macro-ends“General duty/liability”  
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engineering, such as safety engineering. 
The cost of silo thinking may be a lack of attention to knowledge 
outside the silo, which may lead into an intelligence trap. Among other 
things, the intelligence trap is characterized by defending a bad solution 
through the application of seemingly flawless logic. An example of such 
thinking in the tunnel safety industry is the major drive to develop 
standardized risk assessment models. In Norway, examples are “TUSI” 
(NPRA 2007) and "TRANSIT" (Schubert et al., 2011). Recently, a new 
risk model from the Norwegian Institute of Transport Economics (ITE) 
has replaced TUSI’s fire model (Høye et al., 2019). Different actors all 
over Europe are taking part in filling the silo with risk analysis models 
(PIARC, 2008). Given that the European Commission is asking for 
harmonized risk analysis approaches (EU, 2004), such developments are 
understandable (Kazaras & Kirytopoulos, 2014). 
However, there is nothing wrong with filling the silo with knowledge 
and better models. The real danger concerns understanding these 
models as the truth about safety, not looking beyond their limitations 
and simplifications. Lateral or multidisciplinary thinking is a preventive 
measure in this respect. Lateral thinking involves expanding the reper-
toire of patterns through which we think about the world (ASCE, 
2008:52; Blockley & Godfrey, 2000:119; de Bono, 1990). This is 
important, in order to obtain holistic understanding of emergency pre-
paredness for complex tunnel systems. Developing design and emer-
gency preparedness approaches based on systems theory will prevent 
safety from being an issue treated in isolation. 
3. Foundation for dimensioning events – Materials and methods 
This section includes findings from investigations after some major 
Norwegian tunnel fires during the past decade. Our starting point for the 
analysis is to gain understanding of the phases of emergency prepared-
ness, i.e. detection, alert, mobilization, rescue, combat, evacuation and 
normalization, by using information from the events. In this paper, the 
safety management practices involved are studied, along with whether 
there are common factors that complicate the emergency response 
performance. 
These events, and our understanding of them through investigations, 
are also important reminders as to which fire scenarios to expect in the 
future.  Dimensioning scenarios are important in determining what 
loads a fire may impose on the emergency response system, including 
the tunnel’s construction and its technical safety systems, the drivers 
and passengers and the emergency responders (fire, police ambulance, 
Norwegian public road administration, municipalities, hospitals and so 
on). 
No one was killed in the presented fires, but international tunnel 
fires, such as the Mont Blanc (Duffé & Marec, 1999; Voeltzel & Dix, 
2004), the St.Gotthard (Bettelini et al., 2003; Martin et al., 2005; 
Voeltzel & Dix, 2004) and the Tauern (Colombo, 2001) tunnel fires 
remind us of the extent and the devastating impact. However, for the 
Norwegian fires discussed in this study, it is easy to portray alternative 
circumstances that may have led to several fatalities. 
3.1. Introducing the cases 
Our analysis builds on seven fires in Norwegian road tunnels, for 
each of which a thorough accident investigation report by the Norwe-
gian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) exists. Table 3 gives an 
overview of the fires, tunnels and some information about the event. A 
common characteristic is that all tunnels and events include single-tube 
tunnels with bi-directional traffic. Oslofjord and Skatestraum are subsea 
tunnels, while the others are mountain tunnels. All tunnels are rather 
narrow, having a width of about 8-8.5 meters and a height of 4.5 m, 
except Oslofjord which is a “T11 profile” with three driving lanes (two 
uphill and one downhill). 
3.2. The process of detecting events and alerting emergency responders 
and drivers 
The process of detecting a fire in a road tunnel is critical for initiating 
the relevant emergency protocols/processes. A general challenge in 
Norwegian road tunnels is the lack of systems for direct and specific fire 
detection. Not one of the tunnels mentioned in this study had specific 
fire detection systems. However, the Oslofjord tunnel was equipped with 
ITV and AID systems that detect vehicles that stop in the tunnel (NSIA 
2013; NSIA 2018). The four other tunnels included in this analysis did 
not have ITV/AID systems. Detection of fire is generally intended to 
happen through drivers seeing the fire and then using the emergency 
telephones or fire extinguishers in the tunnel to notify TCC. When an 
emergency telephone is being used or a fire extinguisher is lifted from 
the cabinet, an alarm is issued to TCC, and the location is confirmed. A 
general challenge is that drivers in the tunnels do not use the emergency 
telephones or fire extinguishers. Instead, they use their own mobile 
phones, which was the case of the first notification in Gudvanga 1 (NSIA, 
2015), in Gudvanga 2 (NSIA, 2016a) and in Måbø (NSIA, 2017). In 
Skatestraum (NSIA, 2016b) and Fjærland (NSIA, 2019), the fire was first 
notified by the use of tunnel equipment. Since Oslofjord had ITV/AID 
systems, the fires were detected by TCC before anyone in the tunnel 
called it in. Hence, having a system for detection makes the actions of 
individual drivers less critical, as it becomes possible to combine 
different information sources. 
Table 3 
Overview of tunnel fires included in this study.  














HGV Engine failure 7.2 km 2000 7 000 (15 %) 7 % 70–90 MW 50 MW 
Gudvanga 1, 
2013 
HGV Engine failure (oil leak under 
pressure) 





Collision with tunnel wall 1.9 km 2002 300 (10 %) 10 % 440 MW N/A 
Gudvanga 2, 
2015 
Bus Engine failure 11.4 km 1991 2 000 (27 %) 3.5 % 30 MW 5 (20) MW*** 
Måbø, 2016 HGV Hydraulic leak near exhaust 
system 
1.9 km 1986 1 000 (N/A) 7.8 % 50 MW N/A 
Fjærland, 2017 Road 
sweeper 
Hydraulic leak near engine 6.4 km 1986 1 500 (20 %) 3.2 % 20 MW N/A 
Oslofjord 2, 
2017 
HGV Engine failure 7.2 km 2000 9 300 (15 %) 7 % N/A 50 MW 
* HGV is an abbreviation for Heavy Goods Vehicle. 
** AADT is an abbreviation for Annual Average Daily Traffic. 
*** The fire ventilation handles fires up to 20 MW but 5 MW is the basis for design (NSIA, 2015). 
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In some Norwegian regions, using the emergency telephone and fire 
extinguishers triggers several automatic measures, such as closing the 
tunnel by red blinking lights, activating fire detection in a pre-
determined fire mode and activating emergency lighting. This automatic 
programming was present in Gudvanga 1 and 2 (NSIA, 2015; NSIA, 
2016a), Måbø (NSIA, 2017) and Fjærland (NSIA, 2019). In the Oslofjord 
tunnel, actions are taken manually be the TCC operators, based on 
alarms and information obtained through the ITV/AID systems (NSIA, 
2013; NSIA, 2018). 
The process of alerting emergency responders and drivers is depen-
dent on well-defined protocols for interacting, available communication 
systems and relevant information to communicate. The Oslofjord fires 
stand out, since the tunnel is equipped with ITV/AID systems. This 
makes it possible for the TCC to gather important information that is 
useful for managing the event. The other tunnels in this study do not 
have such equipment, and the TCC and emergency responders are 
dependent on information from drivers or being present in the tunnel. 
In the Gudvanga 1 fire, the fire was detected by a driver using a 
mobile phone to call the central emergency number, 110 to alert the 
regional fire operation center. Three minutes after being notified about 
the event, 110 central alerted TCC with a request to close the tunnel. The 
tunnel was then closed manually by activating red blinking lights. Since 
the fire was called in by a driver using a mobile phone, TCC did not know 
the location of the fire, even though a fire extinguisher was removed 
from a nearby cabinet five minutes after the first notification. TCC was 
lacking confirmation from the 110 central and thus the necessary deci-
sion support to activate “turn and drive out” signs. It was when a fire-
fighter lifted a fire extinguisher from an emergency station near to the 
fire that the location was first confirmed. This happened approximately 
45 minutes after the first call about the fire (NSIA, 2015). In contrast, 
during the Oslofjord 1 fire, the TCC knew the exact fire location 
immediately and had an overview of the remaining vehicles in the 
tunnel before it was filled with smoke. Nine minutes after the fire was 
detected, TCC broadcasted a radio message to all vehicles in the tunnel. 
This radio message was later repeated (NSIA, 2013). 
The Fjærland tunnel fire is also interesting in regard to the alert 
phase. NSIA is concerned with the lack of appropriate communication 
equipment, communication protocols and briefing of the crew in this 
event (NSIA, 2019). The fire occurred during regular washing of the 
tunnel late in the evening. During the washing operation, an escort 
vehicle was leading convoys, to maintain traffic flow. When the driver of 
a sweeping vehicle discovered there was a fire in his vehicle, he 
retrieved a fire extinguisher from a nearby emergency station to notify 
TCC about the fire. He then notified the police, using his private mobile 
phone, and triple notification to all emergency services was issued. 
While talking to the police, the driver of the sweeping vehicle was un-
able to confirm what tunnel he was in. The driver was also unable to 
notify his colleagues in two washing cars ahead, as well as the escort 
vehicle of the convoy. The mobile phone intended for this purpose had 
been left behind in the vehicle when he evacuated. When TCC reached 
out to the contact person, who was the driver of one of the washing cars, 
the contact person could not confirm that there was a fire. Communi-
cation went back and forth between different actors in the washing and 
traffic management operation, trying to find out what was going on. The 
driver of the sweeping vehicle started walking towards the portal and 
met the convoy and escort vehicle. He notified the driver of the escort 
vehicle, who then notified the drivers in the convoy. 
3.3. The process of mobilization, focusing on situation awareness for 
emergency responders 
As mentioned in the previous section, systems for gaining situation 
awareness are not commonplace in Norwegian tunnels. In our study, 
only the Oslofjord tunnel had ITV/AID systems. TCC is dependent on 
information and actions from drivers and emergency responders, to gain 
awareness of the situation. Although the Oslofjord tunnel had ITV/AID 
systems, there was no system for automatic real-time registration of 
vehicles in the tunnel. The location and direction of vehicles is consid-
ered by the operators to be critical for effective traffic surveillance and 
management. The operators used the ITV system manually to count 
vehicles, which is a time-consuming task (NSIA, 2018). 
It is clear that NSIA is critical of the safety management of the 
Oslofjord tunnel and the lack of ability to maintain a calibrated risk 
picture (NSIA, 2018; NSIA, 2013). After Oslofjord 2, NSIA points out 
that the emergency preparedness plan refers to annual average daily 
traffic (AADT) numbers from 2010, while the numbers in 2017 were 30 
% higher. They also point out that the defined tunnel class determines 
maintenance intervals. The tunnel was originally defined as “class C” but 
should have been “class D” in 2017, according to its development in the 
AADT level. NSIA is also critical of the selected six-year frequency of 
periodical inspections, as the status of technical safety systems may 
affect the possibility to conductg self-evacuation during a fire event. 
Lacking information about existing technical faults led to unexpected 
workloads for the operators during the fire, which potentially diverted 
the focus away from gaining situational awareness. NSIA specifies a 
safety recommendation concerning a system registering the totality of 
faults, in order to conduct efficient surveillance on the tunnel’s technical 
safety status (NSIA, 2018). In addition, one “turn and drive out” sign was 
out of service, radio messaging did not work during the fire, the emer-
gency responders’ communication system was not working properly, 
and TCC received a door alarm from seven evacuation rooms, but only 
one room was in use. In the Skatestraum fire, the TCC operator was 
unaware that the radio broadcasting system was not functioning during 
the fire (NSIA, 2016b). 
3.4. The process of combating the fire, focusing on smoke control 
strategies 
Fire ventilation becomes necessary because the fire is allowed to 
grow. It is interesting to note that the driver of the vehicle involved in 
the fire tried to extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers in 
both Oslofjord 1 and 2 and in Gudvanga 1 and 2. However, the driver 
was unable to extinguish the fire using the available portable equipment 
(NSIA 2013; 2015; 2016a; 2018). 
All tunnels in this study include systems for longitudinal fire venti-
lation. In all cases, the ventilation direction is predefined, on the basis of 
the most capable fire department having access to the accident. There 
are, however, different strategies for activating fire ventilation. In the 
Oslofjord tunnel, the ventilation stops when the tunnel closes. The TCC 
operator uses the first (maximum) seven minutes after detecting a fire to 
gain an understanding of the situation. The operator shall, in collabo-
ration with 110 central or the on-scene fire commander, decide when or 
if to start smoke ventilation. In Oslofjord 2, this procedure was in use, 
and a decision to start fire ventilation was taken six minutes after the 
ventilation system was shut down. Six ventilators did not work, four of 
which were known to be out of service before the fire. The direction of 
the ventilation is predefined in the protocols on the basis of fire 
department capacity. NSIA raises questions about this protocol, as, in 
both Oslofjord 1 and 2, it led to smoke filling a large portion of the 
tunnel, exposing more vehicles and people to smoke. 
In the western region of Norway, where the Gudvanga, Fjærland and 
Skatestraum tunnels are located, fire ventilation starts automatically in 
the predetermined direction when a fire extinguisher is taken out of its 
cabinet or when an emergency phone is in use. In Gudvanga 2, the fire 
department requested TCC to wait before activating the longitudinal fire 
ventilation, but ventilation activated automatically towards Gudvangen 
when a bus driver removed a fire extinguisher from the tunnel wall. This 
resulted in changing the natural draft direction, which was towards the 
nearest portal (360 m distance to the Aurland portal) at the time of the 
fire. When the direction of flow was changed, smoke was pushed a 
distance of nearly 11.4 km. Five persons were trapped in the smoke, 
none of whom lost their life (NSIA, 2016a). In Gudvanga 1, a driver 
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made use of a mobile phone to notify authorities about the fire. There-
fore, TCC had to activate the fire ventilation manually. The Gudvanga 1 
fire was also located closer to the Aurland portal. The predetermined 
direction of fire ventilation led to approximately 8.5 km of the tunnel 
being filled with smoke. A total of 67 people were trapped in the smoke 
and had to evacuate the tunnel under severe conditions. No one lost their 
life, but five were diagnosed with very serious injuries and 23 with 
serious injuries (NSIA, 2015). 
According to normal procedure, fire ventilation is activated auto-
matically when a fire extinguisher is removed from an emergency sta-
tion in the Fjærland tunnel. However, TCC stopped the fire ventilation 
manually, assuming the sweeping vehicle had damaged an emergency 
station. Seven minutes later, the fire was confirmed at TCC and fire 
ventilation was activated manually (NSIA, 2019). This illustrates the 
importance of situation awareness and confirmation of the event. 
3.5. The process of evacuation and rescue 
Challenges associated with the evacuation process and people get-
ting trapped by the smoke were major issues in both Oslofjord 1 and 2 
and Gudvanga 1 and 2, and also in Fjærland. A common factor in these 
fires is smoke being ventilated towards the portal furthest away from the 
fire, the direction having the greatest potential for people being trapped. 
A major difference, however, is the lack of measures to obtain situational 
awareness in the two tunnels. The Gudvanga tunnel did not have any 
cameras installed, while cameras were available in both Oslofjord fires. 
In accordance with the emergency preparedness plan for the Gud-
vanga tunnel, longitudinal fire ventilation was activated in the pre-
determined direction, in Gudvanga 1. The decision to activate fire 
ventilation, and its direction, is automated, without any concern for the 
specific situation. It is possible to override the ventilation strategy, i.e., 
stop, decrease or revert the flow (NSIA, 2015). However, building a solid 
decision support for making this choice is difficult, time-consuming and 
highly dependent on information from people inside the tunnel. In 
Gudvanga 2, five persons were trapped in the smoke and sought refuge 
in vehicles. After receiving information about trapped people (contact 
via mobile phones), the emergency responders ordered a change in the 
ventilation direction. The five people in the tunnel were found by smoke 
divers from the fire department after ca. 1.5 hours and were transported 
to hospital for treatment for smoke injuries (NSIA, 2016a). 
The possibility for gaining situational awareness to support the 
evacuation process was better in the Oslofjord fires. The exact location 
of the fire was known as soon as the HGV stopped. The operators at TCC 
were also able to perform a manual search of the tunnel using the ITV 
system, before activating the fire ventilation system. The support for 
optimizing the ventilation strategy, to support the evacuation process, 
was thus much better. Still, in Oslofjord 1, a decision was taken to 
ventilate the tunnel in the predefined direction, and 5.5 km of the tunnel 
was filled with smoke. When the fire started, 34 persons were in the 
tunnel. Of those, 25 managed to evacuate without assistance; emergency 
personnel assisted nine people, eight of whom had sought refuge in SOS 
stations and later managed to enter the space between the concrete 
tunnel lining and the rock. Thirty-two people were treated in hospital 
(NSIA, 2013). After Oslofjord 1, the NPRA installed evacuation rooms in 
the tunnel. In Oslofjord 2, two people evacuated to evacuation rooms 
and were there for 32 and 42 minutes before being assisted by the fire 
department. Through cameras and telephones in the evacuation room, 
operators from the TCC were able to stay in continuous contact with the 
two people during the event (NSIA, 2018). 
The Skatestraum fire was an extreme event. Calculations show that 
the heat release rate may have been above 400 MW during the initial 
phase of the fire, and the ceiling temperature above the fire was calcu-
lated to be about 1350 ◦C (NSIA, 2016b). In situations like these, instant 
decision-making and actions are necessary to save lives. The Skate-
straum fire may serve as an example that an effective evacuation process 
is possible when the risk awareness of the involved personnel matches 
the situation. 
In summary, also discussed by (Njå & Kuran, 2015), it takes too long 
before road users are aware of dangerous situations in tunnels and 
prepare for self-evacuation. The organizing of self-evacuation is arbi-
trary and, to a very small extent, adapted for road users’ needs. The road 
users do not possess knowledge of tunnel fires, e.g., illustrated by 
keeping little distance from the vehicle in front and postponing evacu-
ation actions. From a system’s perspective, buyers of transport services, 
transport salesmen, forwarding agents, transport companies and drivers 
of HGVs containing a large amount of energy have been considered and 
scrutinized very little, with respect to their roles and responsibilities 
regarding major fires in tunnels. Knowledge amongst tunnel authorities, 
owners and users regarding fire dynamics, heat development and smoke 
dispersion in tunnels is weak. 
4. Systems thinking in safety management – A matter of control 
4.1. Introducing systems theory to tunnels 
From a systems perspective, we cannot discuss the fire safety levels of 
a tunnel without taking into account all the hierarchical layers, 
including owners, users, contractors, emergency responders, other 
stakeholders and the situational context (Santos-Reyes & Beard, 2001). 
Fire safety and accidents are considered properties of the system as a 
whole, i.e., properties which are only meaningful in an elevated hier-
archical layer of control (Leveson, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997; Checkland, 
1999). 
Tunnel systems are complex, open socio-technical systems, meaning 
that they impose changes on, and are changed by, their environment 
(Checkland, 1999). It is therefore relevant to regard tunnels as adaptive 
systems operated within an envelope of safety, bounded by safety con-
straints (Bjelland et al., 2015). Effective safety management is about 
responding to system changes, using effective control mechanisms. For a 
road tunnel, such changes may for instance be: increasing AADT (NSIA, 
2013; 2018), changes in traffic type, ageing components and sub- 
systems, new energy carriers in vehicles, new digital technologies 
installed in tunnels, climate changes, etc. Recognizing such changes and 
their impact on the tunnel system and the processes we want to control is 
critical, in order to enforce relevant safety constraints. This is about 
knowing at all times the status of the tunnel system in relation to the 
processes that we are controlling. 
For instance, the “evacuation process during a fire” is an example of a 
process that needs controlling. Identifying (parts of) the system that 
influence this process enables the interactions between system elements, 
actuators necessary to enforce constraints, sensors that feedback infor-
mation about the system elements and the process’ status, etc. to be 
modeled (Leveson, 2011). Our study of accident investigations in section 
3 shows that tunnel owners, tunnel contractors/maintainers, tunnel 
drivers/users, TCC operators and emergency response personnel are 
important system actors influencing the evacuation process and, thus, 
should be subject to safety constraints. These actors interact with tech-
nical system elements, such as the fire detection system, the supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, the fire ventilation sys-
tems, the radio broadcasting systems, etc. Designing and maintaining 
such technical systems should take into account the scenarios that might 
occur, where continuous learning will challenge the selection of 
“dimensioning” scenarios. 
Systems thinking is not necessarily a substitute for, but it may serve 
to complement, risk-based thinking (Kazaras et al., 2012). Different 
phases of a system’s development or operation may need different 
management tools. The systems-oriented approach emphasizes the 
description of the system, the development of dimensioning scenarios 
and the identification of necessary safety constraints in order to keep the 
system in a safe state. Instead of looking for probabilities, uncertainties 
and adverse events, we look at road users’ and emergency services’ 
performances, to ensure that safety is controlled for the tunnel system. 
H. Bjelland et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Safety Science 143 (2021) 105408
7
4.2. Safety control structures 
According to Leveson (2011), accidents are products of inadequate 
control or enforcement of safety-related constraints on the development, 
design, and operation of the system. Accidents may occur due to 1) 
failure to identify hazards and safety constraints, 2) failure to maintain 
safety constraints, 3) inconsistency between process behavior and pro-
cess models, and 4) lack of system state feedback in order to update 
process models. Fig. 1. illustrate that effective control of the evacuation 
process is dependent on adequate control actions during the planning/ 
design and construction phases. 
The self-rescue principle is an important design presumption for 
Norwegian road tunnels. Following this principle, the tunnel design 
shall be consistent with the capabilities of the road users and the 
emergency scenarios that might occur. The evacuation process itself is 
not under any systematic control or intervention, besides the road users’ 
own control actions within the tunnel. 
In tunnels, feedback from the various processes requires sensors. 
Norwegian road tunnels (at least the single-tube rural tunnels) are 
scarcely equipped with sensor technology. Adequate feedback from the 
process (emergency situation) is arbitrary, dependent on the individual 
actions of road users (sensors involve fire extinguishers and emergency 
phones, which may or may not be used). From the narratives of Oslof-
jord 1 and 2, it is found that vehicles enter the tunnel against red lights 
and closing gates. Similar findings are reported, e.g., in the Mont Blanc 
tunnel fire in 1999 (Shields, 2005). This indicates poor feedback from 
the incident and/or inadequate control actions by the traffic manager. 
The road users are simply not convinced that stopping is the best 
alternative. 
There is a great potential to enhance safety, by providing better 
sensors in the tunnels and strengthening control of the evacuation pro-
cess. People are reluctant to initiate immediate evacuation in the early 
stages of fire emergencies, but it also suggests that information is key to 
compensating for indecisive behavior. 
5. Safety constraints for emergency management (response) in 
tunnels – A framework 
In this section, the development of safety constraints from the use of 
fire investigations is discussed, and how to put such constraints into 
action. Adopting this approach to the N500 regulation will introduce 
major changes to existing compliance-based road safety management 
practices, but it will also embed the increased weight on the tunnel’s 
emergency preparedness system into practical administration work. 
Current safety management practices are not described further than 
evidence from the narratives in section 3. This section deals with the 
framework to develop safety constraints for the emergency management 
system in tunnels. 
5.1. Safety constraints 
Developing safety constraints follows a systematic process involving 
five steps:  
1. Define the system, including system boundaries and interactions 
with its environment.  
2. Define the system’s functional safety requirements. 
3. Conduct hazard identification associated with the specified func-
tional requirements.  
4. Develop a set of valid scenarios, based on the hazard identification 
process, and conduct appropriate modeling to explore the bound-
aries and basis for safe operation. The validity of the scenarios is 
assessed by coherence principles, see Bjelland et al. (2015), which is 
not elaborated further here. However, narratives from real tunnel 
fires, which represent empirical evidence of what might happen, are 
strong coherence indicators (data priority, analogy).  
5. Define the set of safety constraints necessary to keep the system in a 
safe state, i.e. to comply with functional safety requirements and to 
ensure that normal functions of the system are maintained. The 
derivation of safety constraints is based on both the hazard identi-
fication process directly and the scenario analyses and expressions 
signifying the level of accepted or prudent practice. 
The notion or concept of constraints may easily be perceived by their 
negative connotations, and – not least related to establishing functional 
safety requirements and pointing at phenomena necessary to keep a 
system in a safe state – possible positive sides of the constraints may, 
thus, be left uncommunicated. Constraints stated through regulatory 
requirements are often expressed as utter limits for expected or allow-
able actions, performance or design traits. This is typical for regulations 
formulated as prescriptive requirements. When opening the door to 
regulations formulated by expectations related to performance, one may 
not merely present statements related to what at the least is to be ach-
ieved. There is even a possibility to present requirements stating that 
good, prudent or sound practice should be adhered to. The acceptable 
deviations from this “core” or “central” norm may vary, according to the 
overall performance of the system. 
For example, the lack of effective mechanisms for the detection of a 
possible problematic incident must be compensated for by more effec-
tive mechanisms for other elements in the emergency preparedness. 
When applying performance-based regulations, coupled with an un-
derstanding of the relevant system, it ideally should be possible not only 
to optimize the balance between proactive and reactive emergency 
preparedness measures but even to arrive at a position to discuss the 
trade-off between costs and benefits related to maintaining safety, as 
well as functions, as expected in a given system. 
Based on the scenarios described in the previous section, this section 
exemplifies a set of recommended safety constraints to keep the tunnel 
in a safe state. Safety constraints are logical developments from the Zero 
Vision strategy, politically enforced in Norway on September 29, 2000. 
Leveson (2011; 2019) distinguishes between system goals, constraints 
and requirements. System goals describe the basic reason for the system. 
A system goal for a road tunnel is, for instance, “transporting passengers 
and cargo from A to B”. System constraints are the acceptable ways a 
system can achieve its goals. It may sound like constraints is another 
word for requirements, but, according to Leveson (2011), there is an 
important distinction. Specifying system requirements is a way of 
refining the system’s goals. While system requirements cannot conflict 
with system goals, this is not the case for the system’s safety constraints. 
For instance, denying access to HGVs in a tunnel, to limit the potential 
fire load, could be an example of a safety constraint that directly con-
tradicts the system’s goal. 
Example: developing safety constraints for a road tunnel:  
• Process: Emergency response to a single-tube tunnel fire 
Fig. 1. Evacuation as a controlled process through planning, construction 
and operation. 
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• Process goal: Prevent the event from developing into an accident that 
causes harm to tunnel users, structure, equipment and the 
environment. 
5.2. Requirements to the set of and single constraints as part of the safety 
control functions 
The safety of a system is “dependent on the enforcement of con-
straints on the behavior of the components in the system, including 
constraints on the potential interactions” (Leveson, 2011:64). The goal 
of enforcing constraints on a system’s components is to maintain con-
trol, where control is the process of retaining the system’s identity and 
performance under changing circumstances (Checkland, 1999:313). A 
control process entails the concept of hierarchy, where an upper level is 
imposing constraints on a lower level. The functions of the upper layer, 
e.g., a road tunnel’s emergency response performance, emerge because 
of the imposition of constraints on the lower layers (Checkland, 1999; 
Leveson, 2011). Checkland (1999:87) specifies that a constraint should 
1) “impose new functional relationships”, 2) “be optimal in the sense 
that it is neither so tight that it leads to rigidity nor so loose that specific 
functions are not generated at the lower level”, and 3) “act upon the 
detailed dynamics of the lower layer”. 
The following set of requirements should guide the specification of 
safety constraints:  
1. They should be observable; they must be clearly defined and open for 
access when needed.  
2. They should be measurable, i.e., it must be possible to verify their 
existence, non-existence or degree of existence. It must be possible to 
establish set points, limit states or criteria monitored by “sensors”.  
3. The controller is critically dependent on knowing the status of the 
controlled process. Hence, the controlled process must allow 
appropriate feedback about the status of the constraints to the 
controller.  
4. They should be evenly distributed amongst actors involved with 
safety management, in order to reinforce collaboration in emergency 
response processes.  
5. They should correspond to an available controller. If there is no 
controller to enforce the constraint, it is meaningless.  
6. They should allow sufficient response and timely changes to the 
process/system due to exceeding constraints targets. 
The following are examples of safety constraints enforced to avoid 
unsafe control actions for a road tunnel system. Following the five steps 
towards establishing safety constraints, it is assumed that the system is 
an existing long single-tube tunnel with bi-directional traffic, similar to 
the Gudvanga tunnel (NSIA, 2015; 2016a), with regard to characteristics 
of the safety equipment, emergency response system, etc. The functional 
requirements are related to the individual processes of emergency pre-
paredness, cf. table 4. Finally, hazard identification and scenario selec-
tion are based on the accident investigation reports in section 3. The 
identification tag following the safety constraints, e.g. (1A), refers to the 
specific cell describing an unsafe control action in table 4. The intention 
of the examples is to illustrate the framework, and they will cover only 
the actors: general tunnel users, HGV tunnel users and TCC operators:  
• Tunnel users in general shall…  
o receive adequate information about the evacuation strategy of 
specific tunnels through training, information campaigns and 
intuitive design (1A).  
o immediately (<1 min from observing the event) alert the TCC 
about fire location and situation (2A).  
o receive in-vehicle information about the accident and preferred 
actions relative to available information about the event and the 
vehicle’s location in the tunnel (3A).  
o receive in-vehicle information about planned actions affecting the 
flow of smoke in the tunnel and preferred actions relative to the 
vehicle’s location in the tunnel and smoke flow direction (4A).  
o receive location-specific preferred actions supporting the self- 
evacuation process of the relevant group of tunnel users (5A).  
• Tunnel users HGV shall…  
o maintain and use in-vehicle systems to monitor vehicle fire risk, 
adopt safe driving behavior (e.g. maintain adequate distance) and 
produce and train for situational-dependent emergency protocols 
(1B).  
o see 2A.  
o see 3A, and take part in training programs to take on a role as a 
preliminary on-scene commander, reinforcing desirable self- 
evacuation behavior during the initial stage of an accident (3B).  
o make sure that the vehicle has available automatic and/or manual 
extinguishment systems, dimensioned according to the relevant 
vehicle fire scenarios (4B).  
o see 5A.  
• TCC operators shall…  
o maintain and use an appropriate system to keep track of the tunnel 
system’s overall technical status, fault alarms and status of safety 
critical repairs (1C). 
Table 4 
Control-processes and related unsafe control activities as basis for constraints.   
Unsafe control activities (examples) 
Actors Control 
process 





Unaware the evacuation 
strategies of different tunnels. 
Unaware the fire hazard in HGV 
(risk status own vehicle). 
Unaware the status of safety 




procedures and lack of 
training. 
Failure to adapt 
tunnel system to a 
dynamic risk 
picture. 
2. Detection and 
alert 
Unaware intended function as 
detector and alert agents. 
Unaware intended function as 
detector and alert agents. 
Delayed detection and 
imprecise information. 
Delayed detection and 
imprecise information.  
3. Mobilization and 
situational 
awareness 
Lack information about the 
accident. 
Lack information about the 
accident and training as on- 
scene commander. 
Lack systems for information 
gathering and 
communication: fire, vehicles, 
people. 
Lack information about fire 
location, vehicles and 
people.  
4. Combat and 
smoke control 
Unaware ventilation strategy. Inadequate fire extinguishment 
equipment. 
Lack information. Lack 
situation-dependent 
protocols. 




5. Evacuation and 
rescue 
Lack of information, risk 
awareness and time. Unaware 
the evacuation strategy in 
specific tunnel. 
Lack of information, risk 
awareness and time. Unaware 
the evacuation strategy in 
specific tunnel. 
Lack information and means 
of communicating with 
people in the tunnel. 
Lack information and means 
of communicating with 
people in the tunnel.   
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o within 1 minute after the initiating event, detect a potentially 
major fire in the tunnel system and verify the fire source and 
consequence potential (2C).  
o within 2 minutes after detecting the fire, obtain an overview of the 
number and location of vehicles in the tunnel and activate a first 
warning to tunnel users. Within 3 minutes after detecting the fire, 
prepare location-specific group-messages to tunnel users (3C).  
o within 4 minutes after detecting the fire, select a situation- 
dependent strategy for smoke control, on the basis of available 
information about the fire, vehicles and people (4C).  
o within 5 minutes after detecting the fire, inform tunnel users about 
the strategy for smoke control and associated consequences and 
also inform about preferred actions relative to the tunnel user’s 
location (5C). 
Following this approach while designing an emergency response 
system will lead to consistency between the hazard identification pro-
cess and the system’s control structure. Time constraints are intention-
ally included, as this will challenge existing design and emergency 
response practices and technical solutions. This will effectively create 
new possible systems that need evaluation against dimensioning acci-
dent scenarios, limitations in available technology and cost- 
effectiveness. 
6. Discussion 
The level of system knowledge amongst the Norwegian tunnel safety 
actors is low. Knowledge about the contents of goods travelling through 
Norwegian tunnels is scant. This is especially true regarding the po-
tential for exposure to toxic substances in serious releases and com-
bustions. The tunnels are socio-technical systems, not very easily 
predicted in the case of future accidental events. As regards tunnel 
owners and the emergency services, the level of complexity is chal-
lenging for their safety management work. To a certain extent, risk 
analysis approaches address simplified systems, which, for tunnels 
similar to the Oslofjord tunnel, might not be sufficient to optimize safety 
and provide useful decision support (Njå, 2016). 
Njå & Svela (2018) suggest that tunnels should be subject to “Safety 
Case” regulations, for which the tunnel owner, in close cooperation with 
the rescue services, needs to demonstrate adequate safety systems and 
emergency response. In this respect, establishing safety constraints 
would contribute to a holistic safety system. The tunnel owner is 
responsible for tunnels being adequately equipped with emergency 
preparedness measures, allowing firefighting and rescue operations. 
Expectations and capacity regarding the local fire service need clarifi-
cation, and the tunnel must be equipped accordingly. Our view is that 
society expects the fire department to push limits to fight a fire in the 
tunnel and rescue people. The fire department also seems to place high 
expectations on themselves, taking more than “their share” of re-
sponsibility in major tunnel fires. The fire department’s actions in the 
Gudvanga 1 fire corroborate this, with personnel from the fire depart-
ment defying thick smoke to search the tunnel. 
In many municipalities, a local voluntary fire department is 
responsible for the emergency preparedness and executive response to 
major road tunnel fires. The emergency preparedness analysis should 
recognize the emergency responders’ limitations and design the tunnel 
accordingly. However, it could be questioned whether this is the prac-
tice today. We question both the local voluntary fire department’s 
competency, with regard to understanding their own limitations, and 
the current emergency preparedness analyses’ ability to identify weak-
nesses and compensate for them by means of safety measures in tunnel 
design. In other words, the tunnel design does not match the emergency 
response capacity, which may lead to an emergency response that does 
not match the situation in the tunnel. This is a clear example of safety 
constraints being violated. 
Compared with road tunnels, the number of fires in Norwegian 
railway tunnels is low. Nevertheless, there has been a rather heated 
professional debate over emergency preparedness measures. On one 
side, the emergency response authorities and local fire departments 
argue that mechanical fire ventilation and water supply for fire extin-
guishing is critical in railway tunnels. Their dimensioning scenario is a 
serious fire in a train inside a railway tunnel. On the other side, the 
tunnel owners argue that such emergency response measures are not 
relevant for their dimensioning scenarios. The tunnel owner puts more 
weight on the fire protection of trains and the train’s ability to drive out 
of the tunnel in case of fire. Recently, RISE Fire Research issued a report 
about dimensioning fire scenarios in railway tunnels on behalf of the 
Norwegian tunnel owner. Although there is uncertainty about fire 
behavior in modern trains, the report recommends a design fire of 20 – 
60 MW and a “fast” fire growth rate. RISE cannot exclude the possibility 
of a fire occurring in an immobilized train in a tunnel, although the 
frequency of such events will be low (Meraner et al., 2020). 
It is interesting to follow this discussion, as it points to the question of 
how to define dimensioning scenarios for tunnel design and emergency 
response, which is a relevant question for both road and railway tunnels. 
To what degree is selecting dimensioning scenarios a matter of scientific 
rigor or value judgements?  Our view is that this ultimately is a value 
judgment, informed by scientific knowledge. Adopting a system 
perspective should clarify the links between the different actors in the 
system and make explicit how top-level value judgements affect the 
design of emergency preparedness systems in road tunnels. Being clear 
about the actors’ different responsibilities is a good starting point for 
strengthening emergency preparedness in Norwegian road tunnels. 
Finally, the importance of control as the major goal of the systems 
perspective on safety is repeated. Open socio-technical systems, such as 
road tunnels, are inherently dynamic. Control in such systems then, is 
more like a thing that you borrow than a thing you own. Maintaining the 
control in the system requires constant measuring of the status of the 
system’s elements, continuous learning from its operation, and imple-
menting learning from previous events, new research and new tech-
nologies. Understanding important principles that affect safety, such as 
the self-evacuation principle, is important. Systems thinking clearly 
shows how it is an inter-disciplinary task to safely control evacuation 
processes. This should be a driver to replace current silo thinking with 
more collaboration. Systems thinking for road tunnel safety will require 
many actors doing things differently. If there is one thing that we can 
learn from previous events it is that continuing without changes will 
lead to new major accidents. 
7. Conclusions 
Successful emergency response to tunnel fires is dependent on many 
actors collaborating on avoiding losses. When a fire incident occurs in a 
road tunnel, time is of the essence. Safety becomes a matter of main-
taining the critical processes necessary to keep the system in a safe state. 
There is little time for planning and weighing different options while 
managing an accident. Efficient decision-making, in situations of major 
uncertainty, is vital to achieve safety goals. This essentially means that 
efficient emergency preparedness for road tunnels is a matter that needs 
attention in the early design phase and continuous improvements during 
the operational phases. 
Emergency preparedness analyses are required in the design phase 
by Norwegian legislation for tunnels greater 1,000 meters. Guidance and 
functional requirements are lacking. The combination of a micro-means- 
based (prescriptive) regulation regime and strong traditions and ex-
pectations regarding emergency response leads to arbitrary emergency 
response performance, determined by standard tunnel design solutions 
and the capability of the local emergency response. The latter involves 
major variations, depending on the location of the tunnel. 
To achieve high-performance emergency preparedness for major 
tunnel fires, there is a need for radical changes in designing and oper-
ating tunnels. Management should shift from being compliance-based to 
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being functionally based, including clear performance requirements for 
the emergency response system. Taking into account the complexity of 
emergency response to road tunnels, such a regulative framework would 
lead to changes in tunnel designs, especially in order to accommodate 
road users’ and local emergency response teams’ different capabilities. 
In this paper, it is claimed that a system-theoretic approach is appro-
priate to deal with the tunnel system’s complexity and drive the design 
of appropriate control structures for critical processes from the design 
phase to the actual emergency. 
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